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1 Introduction
Traditionally, theory (or model) of mind is seen as putting 
oneself in another’s head, assuming that one already knows 
one’s self and thus understands others through that process. 
That is, understanding of ‘I’ precedes that of ‘Thou’ and 
‘Me’ (myself in others’ eyes). However, both phylogeni-
cally and ontogenically, there is good reason to believe that 
the opposite may be the case. We understand ourselves as 
sentient beings, because to understand others, we need to 
understand their models of us, including imputed intentions 
and feelings. In other words, ‘me’ precedes ‘I’ and con-
sciousness of self is an accident of sociality, or in Buber’s 
terms, emergence of ‘I’ from ‘I–You’ (Buber 1923, p 74).
Philosophically, this connects with notions such as Witt-
genstein’s meaning as use (Wittgenstein 1958) and philos-
ophies of embodiment (Clark 1998; Shanahan 2010), but 
stands against both Descartes’ (1759) primacy of the inter-
nal and Damasio’s (1999) focus on extensions of physical 
body image. Taking a more reflexive view does not deny an 
internal life, but sees it as derived from cognitive abilities 
attuned to the external and inter-social. This is also related 
to the way that Burling suggests turning traditional theo-
ries of language development on their head, regarding the 
development of comprehension and reception as preceding 
production (Burling 2005).
Practically, this reflexive viewpoint suggests that models 
for artificial intelligence based on presenting and interpret-
ing for others may be more fruitful than those starting with 
internal cognitive and emotional processes. For conscious-
ness, this suggests starting with models that interpret oth-
ers’ intentions and, in particular, others’ models of others: 
that is, looking to build theory of mind before self-model-
ling. For emotion modelling, this suggests creating robots 
or avatars that express and interpret emotion, rather than 
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building emotion models. The suggestion is that, by taking 
this stance, models of self-knowledge and personal affect 
will naturally emerge.
Ethically, this extends the behavioural view embodied 
in the Turing Test. From this view, one might judge that 
a robot or AI is an ethical agent when we see it as such. 
A more reflexive approach would add to this by ask-
ing to what extent an artificial agent is able to model and 
assess the extent to which they will be held accountable or 
blameworthy by others, or even more complex levels, such 
as “how will others consider I considered my actions?” 
Buber’s “I and Thou” is both philosophical and theological, 
steeped in Judeo–Christian and other spiritual traditions. 
This raises the question of whether it is meaningful to con-
sider artificial spirituality as well as ethics, possibly as an 
outcome of a programmed motivation towards relationship. 
While this at first appears even more speculative than con-
siderations of artificial consciousness, there may, in fact, be 
very immediate practical implications.
The remainder of this paper starts by describing the phe-
nomenon called ‘theory of mind’, different views on it and 
on the related issues of self and consciousness of self. It 
then looks at the phylogenic development of self, how it is 
that humans have evolved to have the fundamental cogni-
tive machinery to be able to perceive their own mental state. 
Traditional models struggle to have plausible small steps 
that lead to ‘self’, and so an alternative more developmental 
path is suggested where theory of mind develops first, fol-
lowed by consciousness of self. This phylogenic argument 
is backed up by an ontogenic review of the emergence of 
self in the child development literature, which shows that, 
at very least, self and theory of mind develop concurrently 
during early years. Methodologically, these two argument 
streams, the phylogenic and ontogenic, are mutually rein-
forcing, matching what is observed today (early childhood 
abilities) with a putative explanation of how this came to 
be. Furthermore, early (more primitive) stages in both can 
often also be observed in other animals. Finally, the article 
explores, as summarised above, the implications that this 
has for artificial models of self and concomitant implica-
tions for robot/AI ethics and spirituality.
2  Encountering other: theory of mind
“Little does she know that I know that she knows that I 
know she’s two timing me” (The Kursaal Flyers 1976).
2.1  What is theory of mind?
Theory of mind is about our ability to see inside someone 
else’s head, to attribute thoughts, desires, beliefs to them, to 
treat them as intentional beings.
Most adults are easily able to ‘mind read’ like this, 
“Oh yes, he’s going to the shop because he wants a pint of 
milk”, “she’s running for the bus but she doesn’t know it 
has already left”. We may make mistakes, and some peo-
ple are better at this than others, but we have no problem 
in imagining these thoughts in other people’s heads. This 
conceptualising of another’s thoughts is first-order theory 
of mind, but it can get more complex.
The Kursaal Flyers’ 1970s hit is an example of higher 
order theory of mind: the singer’s knowledge of his girl-
friend’s lack of knowledge of his knowledge of her knowl-
edge of his knowledge that she has been two timing him.
First order Conceptualising of another’s thoughts—“she 
knows that I know”.
Second order Conceptualising of another’s thoughts 
about your thoughts (or those of a third person)—“I know 
that she knows that I know”.
Third order Conceptualising of another’s thoughts about 
your thoughts of their thoughts “little does she know that I 
know that she knows that I know”.
Fourth order The singer himself knows the statement.
Fifth order The singer must assume that we do not know 
that he knows this, otherwise why tell us (except maybe 
just to make catchy lyrics).
It is very hard to keep track of the lyrics of the chorus 
verbally, showing that our ability to manage these higher 
order theories of mind is limited. Happily, the song came 
with a video acting out the story in the verses of the song. 
It showed the singer, and across the street in a launderette, 
the singer’s girlfriend with another man. The girl catches 
sight of the reflection of the singer in the chrome rim of 
the washing machine—she knows that he knows. However, 
she does not realise that he saw that she had seen him—she 
does not know that he knows that she knows. The complex 
modal reasoning becomes much simpler when embodied in 
a real situation.
2.2  How do we manage theory of mind?
There are two main explanations of theory of mind. The so-
called ‘theory theory’ posits a cognitive model of the other 
person as a social being, but not totally unlike one’s mate-
rial model of a physical object like a rock; that is, one sim-
ply has an understanding of their actions and behaviours, 
without using an analogy to oneself. In contrast, ‘simula-
tion theory’ suggests that we effectively imagine ourselves 
in the other’s shoes; this is also the common way in which 
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theory of mind is talked of informally. In addition, in a spe-
cial case of simulation theory, some writers adopt an eco-
logical or embodiment view, taking the physical body and 
actions as central. Notably, Damasio suggests that we do 
not imagine our head in another’s head so much as imag-
ine being in another’s body (Damasio 2010, p 104). There 
are even a few writers who effectively seek to eliminate (a 
particular meaning of) self and other entirely (Metzinger 
2009).
However, those who regard the theory of mind and the 
idea of ‘self’ as real typically assume that we effectively 
‘know our own mind’, albeit understanding the knowing 
in myriad different ways. For example, Tomasello talks 
about the ability of organisms to “understand conspecifics 
as beings like themselves” (emphasis Tomasello) and thus 
able to imagine themselves in the “mental shoes” of others 
(Tomasello 1999, pp 5–6). Likewise, as alluded to above, 
Damasio talks about understanding the actions of others by 
“placing ourselves in a comparable body state” (Damasio 
2010, p 104).
In both cases, this putting ourselves into the place of 
another is supposed to give us greater understanding, under 
the assumption that we already know more about ourselves 
than about others. In other words, the dominant models of 
theory of mind assume that human consciousness of self 
and of our own thought processes precedes our understand-
ing of other people’s thought processes.
However, it is not so obvious that knowing one’s own 
thought processes is so simple; indeed, all analyses of 
expert behaviour reveal how hard it is to externalise our 
own tacit knowledge and ways of thought (Schön 1984; Dix 
and Gongora 2011). Neither is it clear that we need to use 
models of self to understand each other; indeed, Gallagher 
and Zahavi, describing the problems of simulation theory, 
quote Wittgenstein, “Do you look within yourself, in order 
to recognise the fury in his face?” (Gallagher and Zahavi 
2008, p 176; Wittgenstein 1980, §0.927).
This paper suggests that in fact, from a phylogenic 
development viewpoint, ‘self’ is actually complex and early 
social understanding may be more ‘primitive’, in the sense 
that a knowledge of other’s thoughts may have developed 
earlier in our own and other species than knowledge of self.
2.3  Consciousness and consciousness of self
“A self that’s unaware of itself is an oxymoron.” 
(Ramachandran 2004, p 97).
“The only sort of consciousness we can describe, or even 
imagine, involves a sense of self.” (Carter 2002, p 218).
For some writers, the consciousness of self is virtu-
ally equivalent with the term consciousness. For example, 
Rosenthal (somewhat circularly) defines ‘conscious states’ 
as “simply mental states we are conscious of being in” and 
“what makes conscious states conscious is their causing 
higher-order thoughts that one is in those mental states” 
(Rosenthal 1986).
The centrality of consciousness of self dates back to 
early philosophers. Notably, according to St Augustine, 
“the mind knows itself to think”.1 However, it is Descartes’ 
“cogito ergo sum” that is the most well-known reference to 
consciousness of self, which for Descartes is not merely 
about defining consciousness, but the primary evidence for 
existence itself.
More recent philosophical investigation of the nature 
of self and consciousness includes a focus on higher order 
thinking (thinking about thinking) (Rosenthal 1986); 
embodied concepts of self as only really existing in activ-
ity with the world (Shanahan 2010); more phenomeno-
logical accounts (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008); as well as 
those who regard consciousness or self as a sort of illusion 
(Metzinger 2009).
There is also extensive psychological research on the 
nature of consciousness and of self. Examples of the former 
include work on understanding differences between con-
scious and unconscious processes at work in phenomena, 
such as blind sight (Carter 2002, p 19), and Libet’s (2005) 
work on the delay between when the brain ‘decides’ to act 
and when a person feels they consciously made that deci-
sion. Examples of the latter include work on the mutability 
of body image when people come to believe a false hand is 
their own (Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Ehrsson et al. 2005) 
and studies of people with disorders of self (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2008, p 208).
Neuroscientists and cognitive scientists also spend time 
trying to track the brain areas or higher level architectures 
that enable consciousness to work; for example, Goldberg’s 
(2001) investigation of the role of frontal lobes or Dama-
sio’s (1999, 2010) work on body image.
2.4  Becoming conscious
One of the core questions of this article is about how we 
come to have the fundamental cognitive machinery for con-
sciousness of ourselves; that is the ability to perceive our 
own thought processes, goals, and intentions, to be able to 
say, “I was just thinking”, or, “I want to”.
Having this explicit knowledge is not the same as think-
ing or wanting; these may be, and often are, purely tacit. 
The consciousness of ourselves as intentional allows us to 
make the tacit internal life explicit, whether to communi-
cate to others or simply to be aware of ourselves. The fact 
that Descartes is thinking is evidence that Descartes exists, 
independently of whether he is aware of it, but for him to 
1 De Trinitate, Book X, quoted in Anscombe (1975).
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say, “cogito ergo sum”, he needs to be explicitly aware of 
his own thinking.
That being the case, we want to dig deeper than the abil-
ity to think and feel, towards the ability to look in on our 
own thoughts and feelings.
Note, this is not Chalmers (1995) ‘hard problem’ of 
consciousness.
Imagine relaxing outside on a summer day, a few small 
clouds passing across the blue sky; you are not explicitly 
conscious of your own thoughts, or paying attention to 
yourself, but you are still conscious, still seeing the sky 
even if you are not attempting to make sense of it or your 
thoughts about it. Nagel (1974) famously asked, “What is 
it like to be a bat?” While this surfaces many issues for 
consciousness (not least fundamentally different senses), it 
seems likely that the bat would not have explicit knowledge 
of its own thoughts and desires; that is, no consciousness of 
self. Yet, it could still be conscious and have an awareness 
of its environment, and if not a bat, then think of a cat, or a 
dog that you know.
This bare awareness of being is what Chalmers termed 
the ‘hard problem’. This awareness is there at the embodied 
level of tacit action (the phenomenological experience of 
perception) and at the internal level (the phenomenological 
experience of self). The latter is possibly a natural exten-
sion of the former, and it seems likely that if we understood 
the hard problem as applied to the simpler, ‘animal’ side 
of our nature and we fully understood consciousness of 
self, then the higher level ‘hard problem’ would not seem 
hard. Of course for those philosophers who believe the hard 
problem does not exist, or can be dissolved by epiphenom-
enological sleight of hand, this is not an issue anyway.
Our scope in this article is purely the more ‘computa-
tional’ side of consciousness of self, which, while not irrel-
evant to the hard problem, is in no way dealing with it.
3  The evolutionary development of self
The standard evolutionary assumption is that things must 
either have a direct functional quality, or be some form of 
accident of a functional quality. This can sometimes be 
indirect, even to the point of apparently mal-adaptive traits 
that may occur due to runaway sexual selection (e.g., pea-
cock tails). However, for something to develop, there needs 
to be a ‘why’, a benefit that improves fitness for survival.
However, it is not sufficient that a complex trait has a 
positive effect; there must also be a path of development. 
Without such a path, we end up with teleological argu-
ments; for example, while the eye is useful for reading on 
a computer screen, this 21st century benefit cannot be the 
reason trilobites first developed rudimentary eyes in the 
Cambrian, 5000 million years ago (Parker 2003). Instead, 
we need to trace a potential development of any present-
day phenomenon from simpler forms. This extends the 
‘why’ question; there must also be a ‘how’: small steps, 
each of which, in its particular developmental niche, must 
have had survival value.
Evolutionary biologists use a combination of fossil evi-
dence and reasoned arguments to examine the way current 
life developed. This form of study was originally focused 
on physical traits, from the eye to upright walking, but 
various authors, including Mithen (1996, 2007), Renfrew 
(2007) and Calvin (1990), use a form of cognitive archae-
ology to seek to understand human cognition as the result 
of a development through prehistory. Similar techniques 
have also been used by Tomasello (1999) in understand-
ing the development of consciousness and by evolutionary 
psychologists studying current social cognition (Cosmides 
1989; Tooby and Cosmides 1997).
Of course, we do not have direct evidence of cognitive 
evolution in the way that we do for physical development, 
just as we do not have direct recording of language before 
writing. Instead, these arguments depend on plausible 
chains of development, building more complex abilities 
upon simpler ones, bringing in, where appropriate, knowl-
edge of present-day cognition, childhood development, 
and, if available, paleontological or archaeological data.
Focusing on consciousness of self, it is clear that having 
an idea of self makes it possible to write Hamlet’s solilo-
quies or books about consciousness. However, just like the 
eye for seeing computer screens, advantages that are only 
manifest in complex society can only yield anachronistic or 
teleological arguments for development. If we are to have 
a useful understanding of how self developed phylogeni-
cally, we need to find appropriate incremental advantages 
for each stage in the development of self.
We will first look at some existing suggestions for the 
way self and consciousness may have developed and then 
the alternative model of the development of self as an acci-
dent of sociality; an argument that, the author would assert, 
is more credible than the standard ‘I first’ model of theory 
of mind.
3.1  Development models starting with ‘I’
Damasio establishes strong arguments for the need to have 
a model or image of one’s own body; as physical beings, 
understanding our physical nature can help us avoid danger 
or seek benefit (Damasio 2010, p  57). He also constructs 
a model of a consciousness more primitive than autobio-
graphical self, but able to monitor its own feelings.
When looking at what consciousness contributes to the 
being, Damasio first suggests that consciousness helps 
self-regulation, but then admits that this argument is 
weakened when considering work on the extensive role 
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of unconscious action (not least Libet’s work). He then 
falls back to the role self has in enabling language and 
culture. However, while this certainly demonstrates how 
self can be powerful in ramping up human development 
of a species once it is present, it is far less convincing as 
an argument for the drivers that caused it to emerge in the 
first place.
Tomasello (1999) discusses issues of self extensively 
when looking at child development, and he also sees this 
and other aspects of cognition as interwoven with the 
development of language and culture.
Other writers also see consciousness and self as emerg-
ing from language. Dennett (1993, p 195) suggests that our 
inner train of thought or stream of consciousness is derived 
from a short-circuiting of what was initially the overhear-
ing of one’s own speech. Ontogenically, the way small chil-
dren (and indeed grown adults) talk aloud to themselves 
while doing complex tasks bolsters this argument (Shana-
han 2010).
Many writers look to narrative as a way of conceptualis-
ing the way we establish a sense of identity (see review in 
Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp  200–202), and again, this 
has parallels in child development, where stories and story 
telling are central even to early infant experience including 
the landmark use of the word ‘me’.
“Stories are one of the fundamental ways in which we 
each create an extended self. The developing child’s cumu-
lative repertoire of stories gives him or her a sense of self 
across time and situation” (Engel 1996).
However, while these uses of narrative and language 
are undoubtedly important, especially for establishing the 
autobiographic self, there appears to be a more primitive 
pre-linguistic sense of self and other, as Wittengstein’s 
early quote suggests. Whether it is your apprehension of 
the emotion of others, or your awareness of your own eye 
movements over a scene, it does not appear phenomenolog-
ically that you are using anything linguistic.
Helen Keller was not deaf and blind from birth, but 
became so when she was less than 18 months, before the 
stage at which she would have attained the more complex 
linguistic structures associated with self-modelling. From 
that stage until Anne Sullivan taught her to communicate 
in full sign language at the age of seven, she had only 60 
simple signs. However, in her biography, Keller describes 
her mental life during these years, including the following:
“I think I knew when I was naughty, for I knew that it 
hurt Ella, my nurse, to kick her, and when my fit of temper 
was over I had a feeling akin to regret” (Keller et al. 1905, 
Ch. II).
Note both her appreciation of Ella’s feelings and an 
awareness of her own emotional being. Of course, this may 
involve an element of backward projection by the adult 
Keller, but to remember this incident suggests that it is not 
pure confabulation and that she did indeed have a relatively 
rich pre-linguistic notion of self and other.
3.2  An alternative view: self emerging from theory 
of mind
The view that knowing oneself is easy and precedes theory 
of mind at first appears natural, but we have seen that it 
has problems as we start to unpack it from an evolution-
ary standpoint. We will now explore an alternative phylo-
genic scenario for the emergence of a simple pre-linguis-
tic self. Critically, this is a reflexive social development, 
where understanding of others precedes self-understanding. 
As mentioned, cognitive archaeology methodology can-
not ‘prove’ a cognitive development scenario that, by its 
nature, leaves no physical trace. Instead, the aim is to cre-
ate a plausible account by producing a series of steps, each 
small enough, and with adaptive value.
The final purpose of this paper is to apply this under-
standing to robotic and AI issues. As such, irrespective of 
whether this is actually how human consciousness of self 
developed, if the account is plausible, then it is a potentially 
valuable way to inform artificial cognitive development.
That said, the author would argue that this model of the 
development of self as an accident of sociality is more cred-
ible than the standard ‘I first’ account of theory of mind, 
which calls self into being with only far-future benefit.
3.2.1  Stage 1: reacting to the environment
The field is full of rabbits. As we approach, they initially 
stop feeding, their eyes fixed on us, and then, as we come 
closer, they run away. Even the simplest creatures react 
to their environment and the other creatures around them, 
whether as potential predators, potential prey, or maybe for 
the clues they offer to food sources.
Some of these reactions are purely instinctive, like our 
own startle response when we hear a loud sound. Others 
may involve more complex learning, as is seen in many 
larger mammals, where the juveniles learn from their moth-
ers, or even in simpler animals, such as tits learning from 
each other to peck the shiny tops of milk bottles.
Figure  1 depicts this situation, focusing on the bear’s 
level of cognition of the world. The human is hunting the 
bear, and the bear has seen the human. Although there are 
many debates about the nature of this representation, the 
bear is, in some sense, aware of the human and depending 
on the perceived threat may ignore, attack or run away.
3.2.2  Stage 2: predicting other creatures’ reactions
Watch sheepdog trials: the shepherds call their dogs, a 
single command, a whistle or a word, and the dog circles 
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round, bringing the flock back towards the fold. This send-
ing round is one of the hardest things to teach, but the won-
der is that it can be taught at all. One would imagine that 
the natural reaction of a predator in the wild, when it sees 
the flock of potential prey, would be to head straight for 
them. However, if the flock scatters, it is harder to catch any 
one of them. Successful wolf packs work as a team, some 
wolves circle round, and some come more stealthily in.
Again, some of these actions are purely instinctive, but a 
more successful predator, particularly a human hunter, has 
some understanding of the behaviour of its prey. In Fig. 2, 
the bear on the right has stage 1 thought processes (1), just 
as in Fig. 1, and may run if the hunter moves quickly. The 
successful hunter needs to have a model not just of the ani-
mal in front of him, but of its possible reactions, what is 
going through the animal’s head (2).
This might mean moving more slowly to avoid scaring 
the animal away, or the opposite, jumping up, so that the 
animal runs away towards the hunter’s mate, so that she can 
spear the prey.
Note that it is not that the hunters are imagining how 
they would react if they were prey, they simply have some 
sort of model of the prey’s responses.
In some ways, this is a very primitive and asymmetric 
first-order theory of mind. The hunter has a model of the 
prey’s mental processes. This might be purely reactive, but 
may include some level of motivation, drives, or intentions. 
For example, the hunter may wait by a waterhole, knowing 
that the prey will go there; in the case of hunting a bear, 
they may wait by a hollow tree with a bee colony within, 
or even, although this is a little more advanced, leave bait. 
This model may also include the prey’s emotional states: 
an anxious prey is likely to be more difficult to get close to, 
and an angry bear more likely to fight back than run away.
The model of the prey’s reactions and thoughts may 
include the way the prey responds to the physical actions 
of the hunters themselves. That is, there may be a level of 
reflexivity even at this stage, albeit purely with regard to 
the external physical actions of the hunter. In some ways, 
this is like the model that one has through procioception, 
nocioception, and seeing and touching one’s own body.
Note that there is a difference between this level of 
model—that another creature reacts to one’s actions—and 
a true physical de-egocentricism. Small children are able 
to know that adults and other children will react to their 
actions before the age when they can perform Piaget-style 
dolls-on-a-landscape non-egocentric-view tests (watch a 
small child fall and look around to see if anyone is within 
earshot before crying).
Similarly, experiments with chimpanzees have shown 
that they are aware of what others in their group have seen, 
and modify their behaviour accordingly (Hare et al. 2001). 
That is, they are using a form of theory of mind, at least in 
terms of the physical perceptions of other chimpanzees.
3.2.3  Stage 3: predicting other humans’ reactions
We will now move on, probably many tens of thousands 
of years, and assume that humans or possibly pre-human 
Fig. 1  Modelling the world. Figures  1, 2, 3, and 4 from McIntyre 
(1923), The cave boy of the age of stone Fig. 2  Predicting other animals reactions. Figures  1, 2, and 3 from McIntyre (1923), The cave boy of the age of stone
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hominids have well-developed proto-theory of mind as 
described above.
Consider what happens when humans interact with one 
another.
In Fig. 3, an early human approaches another.
The approaching man has a spear in his hand, so the sit-
ting woman’s first reaction might be to reach to grab the 
hand axe beside her in case he is aggressive. However, 
she is also aware that grabbing a weapon might make him 
angry or nervous and start a full-blown fight.
That is, she has a model of the approaching man, his 
mental state, and his potential reactions, just as she does of 
animals in stage 2.
However, they are not dealing with simple animals. 
They are each capable of having models of each others’ 
mental states and intentions. Therefore, when you interact 
with another person, their mental state includes a model of 
your own. It will be clearly be advantageous if your own 
model can be more complete and in particular include the 
model the other person has of you.
Figure 3 illustrates that the approaching human’s model 
of the sitting human includes the fact that she has a model 
of him. It is clear how this slightly more complex under-
standing could aid social interactions. If the sitting human 
picks up her axe, the obvious reaction for the approaching 
human might be to raise his spear. However, if he is able 
to think, “it’s just because she thinks I am aggressive”, he 
might instead lower it and defuse the situation.
3.2.4  Stage 4: from second-order theory of mind to self
So far, we have progressed through three stages of gradu-
ally increasing complex mental models:
1. Representations of the environment and creatures in it;
2. Predicting other creatures’ behaviour by modelling 
their stage 1 thought processes; that is simple first-
order theory of mind;
3. Including in models of other people their stage 2 mod-
els of one’s own thought processes; that is simple sec-
ond-order theory of mind.
This progression shows how second-order theory of 
mind, understanding other people’s models of one’s own 
mental state, can arise progressively from simpler predic-
tive models of other creatures and other humans. Some 
levels of this model making we probably share with other 
creatures, such as pack hunters and those that exist in 
social groups; some are probably uniquely human.
The steps are each smaller than an ex nihilo emergence 
of self, and each has value even when only partly formed. 
Even partial changes between stage 1 and stage 2 would 
constitute a survival advantage; for example, awareness 
of what other creatures have seen, as in the chimpanzee 
experiments of Hare et al. (2001). Furthermore, we have 
evidence that at least some of these are present in crea-
tures today.
Note that once they are at stage 3, the humans in Fig. 4 
effectively have a model of themselves through the other 
person’s eyes. Even without fully internalising this model 
of one’s own thoughts, the early human can start to 
accrue some of the advantages of a conscious idea of self, 
posited by authors such as Damasio (2010). This then 
starts an evolutionary positive feedback loop, as better 
models of oneself start to correlate with internal feelings, 
with incremental improvements leading to incremental 
benefit.
Given such a model of our own thought processes from 
another’s viewpoint, it is then a short step to effectively 
bypass the ‘other’, in the same way that Dennett (1988) 
imagines personal narrative of self emerging from speaking 
and hearing oneself, and over time bypassing the physical 
articulation of words.2
That is, because an early human (or maybe hominid) has 
a model of the other’s model of ‘me’, the human develops a 
self-image of its own intentions: “I”.
2 Elsewhere Dennett (1991) creates a putative story of the develop-
ment of self, using an argument not unlike the methodology here. His 
derivation leaps abruptly from self as tacit distinction from others to 
self-narrative and self-presentation. To some extent this paper bridges 
part of that gap.
Fig. 3  Simple predictions about other humans—first-order theory of 
mind
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4  Childhood development of self and other
The previous section developed a phylogenic argument 
for the development of self from social interaction. In this 
section, we will look at the way concepts of self and other 
emerge during childhood development, and see that there 
are parallels of this dialogical emergence of self ontogeni-
cally as well as phylogenically.
While, in its pure form, the Victorian adage “ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny” has been debunked, childhood 
development is still used as a touchstone when consider-
ing impossible to observe phylogenic development in areas 
such as language. While this is not a direct relationship, 
more complex structures are assumed to build from simpler 
ones both in evolutionary development and in childhood 
development.
As we have discussed, there are various meanings to 
‘self’ and different awareness of self and other emerges at 
different stages of typical childhood development.
Physical self-exploration, touching and visually inspect-
ing one’s own body, happens for the youngest age (Gal-
lagher and Zahavi 2008, p  207), and arguably aspects of 
tactile self-examination may even be pre-natal. Mimicry is 
also very early, starting typically with tongue poking, and 
the underlying mirror neurons that enable this are not only 
innate in humans, but have been shown to be present in 
other animals also. Richer notions of self and other emerge 
throughout childhood, and more complex higher order 
theory of mind is still developing in older children (Liddle 
and Nettle 2006), and possibly throughout adult life.
4.1  Three levels of other
Tomasello (1999, p  180) identifies three main levels of 
awareness of others, which have been adopted by other 
writers. The first, identified by mimicry and related behav-
iours, he terms understanding of others as ‘animate beings’ 
and, as noted, is present from or soon after birth.
The next major stage, understanding of others as ‘inten-
tional beings’, emerges at around 9 months. Gaze follow-
ing and shared attention are key signs of this stage. This is 
uncommon amongst non-humans.
Tomasello’s final stage is the understanding of others 
as ‘mental beings’; occurring at around 4–5 years; this is 
the point when children are able to perform basic theory of 
mind tests, in particular false-belief tests. There are vari-
ants of these; in the classic version, the child is told a story 
about Sally and Anne. Sally and Anne are in a room; Sally 
hides a marble in a basket, but while she is out of the room 
Anne moves it; then Sally returns to the room. The child is 
asked, where will Sally look for the marble? Younger chil-
dren select the location to which Anne moved it, but older 
children are able to realise that Sally does not know this 
and so will look in the original basket.
While Piaget’s classic Three Mountain test of egocentri-
cism (Piaget and Inhelder 1956) suggests that a full ability 
to de-centre (at least in terms of visual viewpoint) is only 
developed at 6–8 years of age, Martin Hughes’ version 
using dolls and ‘hiding’ from a policeman (a more realis-
tic task than picture matching), suggests de-centring much 
earlier, around 3.5–5 years of age (Hughes 1975; Donald-
son 1978); that is agreeing very closely with Tomasello’s 
third stage. Note that we will see that even this may be con-
servative and some aspects of de-centring may emerge far 
younger still.
It is interesting that Hughes’ study and others arising 
from Margaret Donaldson’s work, which also yield younger 
developmental ages, all use more concrete versions of Pia-
get’s classic tasks. Note too that even when dealing with 
an identical situation, the verbal description in the Kursaal 
Flyers’ song, mentioned previously, is far harder to grasp 
than the visual action of the video.
4.2  Beyond and between
The Kursaal Flyers’ song exposes the complexity of 
higher order theory of mind, which develops far later. 
Tests of higher order theory of mind suggest that while 
first- and second-order theories of mind are well mas-
tered by 10 years, stories involving third order of mind 
Fig. 4  Understanding other people’s understanding of oneself—sec-
ond-order theory of mind
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are only understood a little above chance, and fourth 
order (like “Little does she know”) not at all (Liddle and 
Nettle 2006).
As well as these more advanced stages, there are also 
other aspects of understanding of others and self that 
emerge between Tomasello’s second and third stages.
By 18 months, infants have some understanding that 
other people have behavioural goals: if an adult tries some 
task, but appears to fail, the child then completes the task—
that is, the child has inferred the goals of the adult (Melt-
zoff 1995 in; Tomasello 1999, p 83). There is also evidence 
that chimpanzees have this level of theory of mind (Call 
and Tomasello 2008).
Parents and carers of young children will also know that 
at this toddling stage, when a child falls, she will often look 
to see if an adult is around. If so she will burst into tears, 
but if not she will get up without any apparent fuss. This 
is not to say that the distress is not real and that also, in 
some circumstances, the child may cry irrespective of the 
presence of others. However, just like the injured footballer 
when the referee is watching, the child’s response of the 
tears may be magnified based on the perception that they 
will be heard by another and lead to external comfort. It is 
interesting that while this is part of the everyday experience 
of parents, the phenomenon does not seem to be discussed 
commonly in the development literature, presumably 
because of the ethical problems in performing experiments.
Around this same age (towards 2 years), Fernyhough 
(2008) notes the first signs that a child is able to detect mis-
taken belief in others, years before formal false-belief tests 
can be successfully performed. He also cites Bartsch and 
Wellman’s (1995) work showing that ‘contrastives’, that is 
where the child uses language which expresses differences 
between beliefs and reality, emerge some time before the 
formal test. As noted earlier, the concrete use of concepts 
often precedes the more formal ‘tests’ for them.
When the author’s own daughter was two and quarter 
years of age, part way between Tomasello’s intentional and 
mental being stages, she was interviewed by a young lin-
guistics student. During the discussion, the child said that 
she had been to the doctor with her baby sister. The student 
asked, “where did you go to the doctor?” From a theory of 
mind point of view, this is itself an interesting question. 
In the context, it was clear that the adult wanted to know 
whether this was a doctor in the hospital or a general practi-
tioner/family doctor, but while the former would be reason-
able to expect from a 27-month-old vocabulary, the latter 
would not! The child’s answer appeared to be enigmatic, 
or maybe a non sequitur, “up the steps”. This answer, how-
ever, would have been instantly recognised by every parent 
in the neighbourhood as the steps (with no ramp!) to the 
GP’s surgery were a major problem when juggling prams, 
pushchairs, and young children.
Note here that child had no problem with the idea that 
the student did not know where the child had been; indeed, 
the child had volunteered that they had been to the doctor, 
tacitly assuming that this was not knowledge shared by the 
student. However, the child failed to understand that the 
contextual knowledge of the geography of the area was not 
shared. In other words, even at 27 months, we see quite 
complex first-order theory of mind for episodic experience 
(where it is obvious that the listener was not present), but 
not for propositional knowledge (where a shared context is 
tacitly assumed).
4.3  The knowledge of me
Tomasello also suggests that, at this stage, an infant might 
first start to become aware of ‘me’ as a concept as she 
becomes aware that an adult’s gaze, which she has been fol-
lowing from object to object, falls on herself (Tomasello 
1999, p 89). As confirmatory evidence of this hypothesis, 
he notes that around this stage (first birthday) are the first 
signs of shyness or coyness (Harter 1983; Lewis et  al. 
1989).
Note that this is a knowledge of oneself as a physical 
thing in the world, not knowledge of one’s own mental pro-
cesses. However, it is reflexive knowledge, quite literally 
seeing oneself in another’s eyes.
Small children often refer to themselves in the third per-
son, and books and websites offering advice to new parents 
explain that small children may struggle with pronouns, 
especially personal context pronouns, such as ‘you’ and ‘I’. 
If Buber is right in emphasising the primacy of the I–You 
relationship for babies, this does not carry through into the 
ability to say words. Instead small children often refer to 
themselves by name: “Sammy go to park”, “Gemma wants 
drink”.
Note that this language is partly because parents’ baby 
language often uses proper nouns to refer to themselves and 
the child. Indeed, parents’ language is critical in encourag-
ing the rate, if not the final endpoints, of children’s devel-
opment of concepts of their own mental states and those of 
others (Kirk et al. 2015).
4.4  Which comes first?
We have discussed a variety of elements of self and other 
as they emerge during childhood.
Physical exploration of one’s own body, beginning pre-
natally, can be observed externally, as can other elements 
of physical awareness, such as recognition in a mirror. 
External social interactions, shared attention and the ability 
to interpret others’ intentions can also be observed exter-
nally. However, internal knowledge of oneself is hard to 
observe before the child can talk about it. It is thus difficult 
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to distinguish language development from the development 
of ego and theory of mind.
The argument of this paper that individuality and con-
sciousness of self emerge through sociality might at first 
seem odd, but, in fact, these abilities develop at exactly the 
same time in small children, a process developmental psy-
chologists term developmental synchronies. (Marraffa 2011).
“Children do not conceptualize their own mental states 
before they conceptualize the mental states of others 
(Gopnik 1993), nor do they talk about them earlier (Bar-
tsch and Wellman 1995)” (from Tomasello 1999, p 75).
Theory of mind has been particularly important to 
researchers in autism. Children and adults with autism 
have problems both understanding other people’s beliefs 
and intentions, and also understanding their own emotional 
state (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Chari 2002). In her review 
of theory of mind and autism, Lantz summarises various 
evidence that autism, while typically not diagnosed until 
later, is in fact already apparent at some of the very early 
stages discussed above: evidence including absence of joint 
attention and treating people more like objects as opposed 
to intentional beings (Lantz 2002).
That is, when considering both the order and disorders 
of development, the emergence of self and the emergence 
of theory of mind are tightly bound. While this does not 
prove the emergence of self from sociality, it is certainly 
consistent and certainly does not support the common view 
that in some way self is ‘easy’.
4.5  Language, knowledge and self
As noted previously, the most clear alternative development 
of self is through language. There are undoubted elements 
of interdependency; not least it seems hard to envisage the 
full development of an autobiographical self without inter-
personal narrative. In addition, if, as suggested by Dennett 
(1988), the stream of thought is internalised verbalisation, 
then explicit awareness of this (e.g., “what was I just think-
ing about”) can only come after the emergence of language.
However, the linguistic origins of self-related language 
presuppose at least a tacit theory of mind. In order to tell 
you stories I need to know that you don’t know already (as 
in the story of the author’s own daughter). The evolutionary 
account was presented without mentioning language, and 
it seems possible that the whole series of stages could be 
achieved with a pre-linguistic cognition.
Donald (1991) suggests three early levels of human 
and pre-human culture. The first is episodic culture,3 
3 Note that there is a slight tension in terminology with psychology 
of memory. Donald’s ‘episodic’ culture is one without episodic mem-
ory; the latter is precisely the ability to recall previous episodes and 
thread them together in a historical narrative.
effectively living in the present, and he suggests that 
apes, even chimpanzees, who have shown a level of the-
ory of mind (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Call and 
Tomasello 2008), are at this level. In terms of self-
awareness, this is likely to involve some level of repre-
sentation of one’s own body (as we have seen babies 
possess almost from birth), but not one’s own intentional 
state. Donald’s third stage is mythic culture and is asso-
ciated with language. However, what he terms the ‘miss-
ing link’ is mimetic culture. This, he suggests, may have 
been present in more advanced pre-human hominids and 
involves a level of non-verbal mental imagery allowing 
relatively complex representation.
The phylogenic account in this paper would be 
entirely consistent with this mimetic level. Indeed, Kel-
ler’s account of her awareness of causing her nurse pain 
and of the ensuing regret would bolster the suggestion 
that this is at least possible. However, it is also possible 
that the final stage emerged in parallel with language. 
Note, we are talking here about the emergence of cog-
nitive structures that enable consciousness of self. It is 
quite reasonable that language is a pre-requisite for cer-
tain cognitive mechanisms to develop in humans as a 
species, but once these are present, they enable individu-
als to have a non-linguistic awareness of self and others.
Whether or not that proto-idea of self existed at this 
stage of development, the cognitive effects of language 
would undoubtedly create a positive feedback with 
notions of self and other. As noted, some pre-linguistic 
level of theory of mind is essential for narrative, but 
being able to name things and concepts then helps to 
solidify and objectify them, a process the author has 
previously called trans-articulation (Dix 2003). The 
author has also previously argued that, while we are not 
fundamentally constrained by our language, there is a 
tendency for words to shape even the physical artefacts 
around us to reflect the vocabulary we have as well as 
the more obvious vice versa (Dix 2009).
Crucially, language is essentially social even if it is 
also recruited for internal thought. That is, both the lin-
guistic and pre-linguistic origins of awareness of self are 
fundamentally reflexive and related to spoken or unspo-
ken relationship.
5  The artificial self
So far, this paper has argued that self emerges from the 
need for social understanding. This reflexive viewpoint 
suggests that models for artificial intelligence based on 
presenting and interpreting for others may be more fruitful 
than those starting with internal cognitive and emotional 
processes.
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5.1  Consciousness and self
Friedenberg (2008) reviews a number of projects aimed at 
establishing a level of artificial consciousness. Some pro-
jects are bottom–up, focused on reproducing the low-level 
mechanisms and architecture of the brain and hoping that 
consciousness will spontaneously emerge. Other projects 
are working top–down, seeking to model explicitly the 
processes of consciousness and self. In establishing crite-
ria for artificial consciousness, Friedenberg turns to Alek-
sander and Dunmall’s five axioms for machine conscious-
ness (Friedenberg 2008; Aleksander and Dunmall 2003): 
depiction (an internal representation of sensorial states), 
imagination (to recall past experiences), attention (selec-
tivity in perception and imagination), planning (ordering 
future events to achieve a goal), and emotion (to evaluate 
and motivate action).
Interestingly, both these selected projects and the criteria 
are almost entirely egocentric, outward looking only inso-
far as the external world is the theatre of action and source 
of reward. Social interaction is left to Friedenberg’s last 
chapter.
This is in marked contrast to Fernyhough, developmen-
tal psychologist and parent, who charts meticulously the 
intellectual growth of his own daughter in the light of cur-
rent scientific knowledge (Fernyhough 2008). The primacy 
of human contact and interaction is a constant theme in his 
accounts. In words that strike so many chords with Buber’s 
writing:
“She is built to talk silently about love, in comfortable 
close-up. Smooching with a baby is so rewarding, partly, 
because it is the one thing they can really do” (Fernyhough 
2008, p. 46).
Remember too the operation of mirror neurons, which 
enable babies to copy tongue movement from the first few 
days after birth: sociality is innate.
Breazeal’s (2002) description of the design of Kismet, 
a ‘social robot’, does take human contact as critical and 
amongst her five key characteristics are being human-
aware, including a theory of mind to understand others, 
and being understood, allowing emotions and desires to 
be apparent in facial expression and actions. For the latter 
Breazeal emphasises that to be understood, a robot should 
‘understand its own self’; however, this falls short of an 
explicitly reflexive model of self.
What, then, would a fully reflexive model of robot self 
look like? Whilst Friedenberg’s (2008) review found bot-
tom–up neural models and top–down cognitive models; we 
need something more outside-in, starting with the other.
For the robot’s physical (or virtual) body, a reflexive 
model is not necessary for simple social actions. If the 
robot wishes to be near another person, then it initiates 
movement towards the person and ‘knows’ that this will 
bring it closer.
At a more complex level, a robot that wants (but need 
not know that it wants) human attention, may wave its arm, 
knowing that this brings attention.
So far, these are still instrumental actions, things that 
either directly cause a desired state, or in a simple predicta-
ble way cause another to perform an action with the desired 
effect.
The next step is to emulate the child who is able to inter-
pret the intentions of others: a robot that if it sees a human 
struggling to perform a task, infers that the human wants to 
achieve a goal and if possible acts to help that goal come 
about. For example, if, while building blocks together, the 
human appears to be collecting red blocks, the robot may 
push a red block into the human’s pile.
For this, the robot needs motivations (emotions/desires/
wants) and also has to recognise goals in others (but not 
those of itself). Critically, one such motivation needs to 
be some sort of collaborative drive. This may be a special 
drive, or might be an outcome of mirroring, close to Dama-
sio’s “understanding the actions of others by placing our-
selves in a comparable body state” (Damasio 2010, p 104), 
or empathy. That is, if I see someone struggling to achieve 
a goal, and I have no other conflicting desires, I have a 
‘borrowed’ desire for that goal; if I see someone happy or 
sad, or predict that they will be so, then I feel a little of that 
emotion. While the latter sounds complex, levels of empa-
thy and judgement of others’ actions are present from the 
earliest age (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992; Hamlin et al. 2010).
The final step is to create simple robot models of 
humans that include the humans’ models of the robot. At 
this point, the robot would have a model of itself, just as in 
Stage 4 of the evolutionary development of self. While this 
sounds more complex than simply building a model of self, 
remember that artificial motivations and drives are likely 
to be modelled by neural networks, or complex Bayesian 
rules, no more immediately apparent to the artificial mind 
than our unconscious is to us. A self-aware robot built, 
apparently, more ‘simply’ would in some way have to re-
represent these ‘implicit’ structures in an explicit declara-
tive form. The apparently more complex reflexive model 
can work from the start with a more categorical (or pre-cat-
egorical) representation.
5.2  Emotion
These reflexive models will include emotions, of others 
and of oneself.
William James, the father of the psychology of emo-
tion, saw emotion as a form of appraisal of bodily state, 
“My thesis … is that bodily changes follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact and that our feeling of 
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the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” (James 
1884). While this idea has been updated and debated in 
many ways (see LeDoux 1998, ch.3, for a review), ele-
ments of it are present in many current theories, and 
indeed, basic emotional responses, such as the startle 
response to loud noises, clearly happen faster than con-
scious emotion.
This is one of the reasons why a bursting balloon can 
be so funny: the startle response raises adrenalin levels, 
but then higher level appraisal works out “it’s all right”, 
so you are left with positive conscious valence, but high 
bodily arousal—hence a belly laugh.
From an artificial modelling point of view, adopting 
a fully reflexive approach would not try to accomplish 
that appraisal directly, but indirectly through the impact 
on others. A reflexively emotional robot would have low-
level emotional circuitry (arousal, valence), but then, at 
a higher level, model the emotions of others and their 
emotional perception of the robot itself.
This does not mean that our high-level conscious 
thinking cannot affect lower level emotion. Regret 
involves quite high-level counter-factual reasoning about 
the situation as it is, and how it could have been under 
alternative actions by the agent. If these alternative sce-
narios are better or worse than the actual outcome, this 
modifies the emotional response positively or negatively, 
which in turn ‘tunes’ low-level learning. When a cogni-
tive model of regret inspired a computational model, this 
improved the rate of game learning by a factor of 5–10 
times (Dix 2005). However, note that in this case, the 
conscious mind is not controlling emotion directly, but 
instead engaging in mental actions that affect emotion.
The reflexive approach means that a robot’s explicit 
model of its own emotional state need not correspond to 
that state. Imagine a ‘fearful’ robot in a difficult situation 
(standoff with another robot!). The robot might actu-
ally take on an aggressive demeanour: doing this would 
create an impression of confidence to others and thus 
increase the robot’s drive for safety. A robot with such 
a reflexive emotional appraisal might even ‘believe’ this 
self-image: bravado, just like many adolescents, and, for 
that matter, adults.
5.3  Deceit and the Turing test
The point of self-deception is that, unless one is suf-
ficiently reflective, one is not consciously aware of it. 
However, plain deception is often used as a litmus test 
for theory of mind—you have to understand that some-
one has beliefs, that those beliefs need not be the same 
as your own or reality, and that you can manipulate those 
beliefs.
There are many non-Machiavellian reasons for deceit: 
play, politeness, privacy, a secret surprise, as well as con-
flict situations. We use ‘white lies’ to oil the wheels of 
social activity, as bare truth is often rude.
Nijholt (2011) reviews various works that embody an 
element of deceit or non-cooperative behaviour as well as 
some of the reasons why we might wish to have deceitful 
artificial agents. Indeed, the Turing Test itself can be seen 
as a form of deceit, as the computer is pretending to be 
human.
5.4  Who decides?
In the classic Turing Test, the computer is deemed intel-
ligent (if not conscious) when the human interrogator 
cannot tell it from a human. That is, it is deemed intel-
ligent by a human. From the point of view of conscious-
ness or awareness of self, we could adopt the same posi-
tion. Ruth Aylett sees robots as becoming social actors 
when people view them as such, “we treat them as if 
they are real characters, as if they really had dreams and 
hopes like us” (quoted in Shukman 2015); Tony Prescott 
(2015) says of his iCub robot child, “Sometimes it even 
leaves me with the surprising feeling that ‘someone is 
home’”.
In the film Ex Machina (2015), Caleb is recruited to 
perform a kind of Turing Test on Ava, an android created 
by the software magnate Nathan4. As a Turing Test, it is 
non-standard, since Caleb knows Ava is not human; how-
ever, the crucial issue is (ostensibly) not just whether 
‘she’ is intelligent, but whether she is conscious. Over the 
course of a number of meetings, Caleb begins to feel 
affection for Ava, and, furthermore, believes that she is 
falling in love with him. In fact, it transpires that she is 
deceiving him and instead merely pretending, a fact that 
Nathan seizes with excitement (well, until he is killed), as 
evidence of her complex emotional understanding—sec-
ond-order theory of mind and consciousness.
Although it all ends badly (albeit with characters for 
whom it is hard to feel sympathy), this may well be the 
right arc if we wish to create truly emotional robots: not 
simply a robot that by some computational mechanisms 
can be said to love, but one that can know that it is loved 
by another, and know that the other knows themself to be 
loved.
4 Only the ostensibly central storyline is considered here; the film 
has been criticised for falling back on classic sexist tropes such as the 
femme fatale and picking up on old but still persistent caricatures of 
the female, like the robot, as not fully human (Watercutter 2015).
67AI & Soc (2019) 34:55–73 
1 3
6  Reflexive ethics
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings 
except, where such orders would conflict with the First 
Law.
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict with the First or Second 
Laws.
(The Three Laws of Robotics, Isaac Asimov 1950).
Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics have become ubiq-
uitous not only in discussions of the governance of robots 
within science fiction, but also in society at large. Cur-
rently, robotic systems obey lower level computational 
rules, but as systems become more autonomous, some form 
of more interpretative rules will become necessary. Asi-
mov (1950) predicted the problems this would bring, and 
created scenarios where, even assuming highly intelligent 
‘positronic’ robot brains, unforeseen consequences emerge.
Asimov’s laws are fictional but remarkably prescient, 
having been drawn up in the days when only the earliest 
computers were being developed; since then, they have 
been both widely quoted and critiqued (e.g., Singer 2009). 
Today, with more than 60 years’ experience of digital 
computation, senior academics and major industry play-
ers, including Google and Microsoft, have tried to create 
laws that are more pragmatic, aimed at designers, rather 
than robots themselves (EPSRC 2014; Nadella 2016; Amo-
dei et  al. 2016). Leading scientists have also called for a 
“ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaning-
ful human control” (Hawking et  al. 2015), attempting to 
preclude such autonomy; however, it is hard to believe that 
this apparently moderate declaration will not be called into 
question, for example if an autonomous robot is shown to 
more accurately and effectively distinguish hostage from 
terrorist in siege situations.
Drawing on Piaget (1932) and Damon (1983), Toma-
sello (1999, p  180) argues that it is at the stage at which 
children develop empathetic understanding of others that 
they move from rule following to true moral reasoning.
Various forms of the ‘Golden Rule’ exist across world 
religions from Hinduism to Humanism, Confucianism to 
Christianity: sometimes stated negatively, “do not do to 
others”; sometimes positively, “do to others”; sometimes in 
terms of love, “love one another”.
“One should also behave towards all creatures as he 
should towards himself” (Mahābhārata).
“The man who loves himself so much, Should do no 
injury to others.” (Udâna).
“love thy neighbour as thyself” (Leviticus 19:18).
“Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Luke 
6:31).
This principle is sometimes included within the broad 
philosophical/social principle of reciprocity, for example, 
the following from The Analects of Confucius:
Tsze-kung asked, saying, “Is there one word which may 
serve as a rule of practice for all one’s life?” The Master 
said, “Is not RECIPROCITY such a word? What you do not 
want done to yourself, do not do to others.” (The Analects 
of Confucius).
However, reciprocity can also include tit-for-tat punish-
ment as well as these more benevolent reflexive principles.
Elements of the Golden Rule often form a key part of 
moral arguments, “how would you like it if X did that to 
you”, and variations of this “getting into another’s shoes” 
moral reasoning are found in Rawls’ (1971) ‘veil of igno-
rance’, which asks how one might like society to operate 
if one did not know which person one was going to end up 
being.
It is also used as a justification of universal human 
rights, although Hardwick’s (2012) critical review of theo-
retical groundings of human rights suggests various weak-
nesses in this, not least the longstanding issue of who pre-
cisely counts as ‘others’: slaves, women, children, people 
of different races? More recent debates around the same 
issue have concerned those with brain death, the unborn, 
animals, and quite critically at the moment of writing, those 
of different religions.
At some point in the future, society may need to con-
sider the issue of robot ‘rights’, especially when consider-
ing ‘social robots’. In 2008, Whitby called for professional 
codes of conduct to be modified to deal with issues of abu-
sive behaviour to artificial agents; not because these agents 
have any moral status in themselves, but because of the 
potential effect on other people. These effects include the 
potential psychological damage to the perpetrators of abuse 
themselves and the potential for violence against artificial 
agents to spill over into attitudes to others (Whitby 2008).
In the TV series ‘Humans’ (2015), human-like androids, 
called ‘synths’, are built to perform mundane tasks, but a 
small number are sentient. Niska, one of the synths, has 
been enslaved (or simply installed) in a form of android 
brothel for human customers. As she escapes, she says to 
the woman who runs the establishment, “everything they 
do to us, they want to do to you”.
This is a fictional and hypothetical scenario; facts, how-
ever, are catching up with fiction. In Canada, a man was 
charged with procuring child pornography after order-
ing a child-sized sex doll from a Japanese company (Rut-
kin 2016). The laws on this currently differ dramatically 
between countries, and ethicists debate whether the effects 
are positive, acting as a form of therapy (as the manufac-
turer believes), or negative, likely to encourage real abusive 
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behaviour. To further complicate this picture, in Shinto, 
according to the designer of the dolls, the dolls themselves 
are considered to have a form of soul (Morin 2016).
Darling (2012) suggests that we may soon have to con-
sider legal rights for social robots and agents, akin to those 
for corporate entities and animals. Darling argues that it is 
the anthropomorphic nature of robots that make them spe-
cial, citing examples where a child would be hurt to see a 
robot pet damaged, and where even a military general felt 
compassion for a battlefield robot.
At a keynote at Web Science 2015, Mia Consalvo pre-
sented her study of the growth and demise of Faunasphere, 
an online simulated-world game (Consalvo 2015). The 
creatures, ‘fauna’, in the simulated worlds were like pets, 
rather like a sophisticated version of Tamagotchi. The play-
ers became very attached to their fauna, which they fed, 
played with, and generally looked after. The extent of this 
became most obvious when the game was closed down. 
In the conference auditorium, many of the audience were 
brought to tears at the description of the distress of the 
players, some taking time off work to be with and tend their 
fauna during their last hours.
These examples point to an emerging first-order defini-
tion of an agent as an object of ethical responsibility: an 
agent has ethical/legal rights when we, as humans, feel that 
it has.
The next stage from this is when agents are able to have 
some model of the way that they are treated. It is increas-
ingly common to use forms of chatterbot as first-line 
response systems. It has been found that users of such sys-
tems adopt verbally abusive language to a greater extent 
than they would do to either a real human operator or a 
non-anthropomorphic computer system (Brahnam 2005; 
De Angeli and Brahnam 2008). Potential solutions to this 
include having agents that recognise and respond to inap-
propriate language (Brahnam 2005). For areas such as cus-
tomer support, this would normally be by deflecting the 
conversation back to appropriate topics, or, in extremis, 
ending a call.
Social robots in the home cannot simply ‘end the call’, 
so one could imagine that a robot, on detecting abuse, 
might respond in language that emulates being affronted or 
distressed. As discussed above, there is arguably no hard 
difference between emotion and emulated emotion; how-
ever, whether or not the agent was ‘really’ hurt, this could 
not help but increase the sense of ethical responsibility of 
the human who caused the ‘distress’. That is, whether or 
not philosophically justified, socially and emotionally for 
the human involved, the extent to which an artificial agent 
is aware that it is mistreated (second-order reflexive) alters 
the ethical severity of that mistreatment.
Having discussed robots as an object of ethical responsi-
bility, let us return to the Laws of Robotics and the Golden 
Rule in relation to robots as agents of ethical responsibil-
ity. Whether or not robots or virtual agents are protected by 
law, can they be prosecuted by law? When a robot behaves 
badly, is it blameworthy itself, or simply its designer or 
owner?
When discussing the potential legal protection of social 
robots, Darling (2012) cites animals and companies as 
examples of non-human entities afforded protection or 
rights under many jurisdictions. However, these differ in 
terms of parity. In the medieval period, animals could be 
tried and even hung (Carson 1917), but nowadays, it is the 
owners of animals who are prosecuted, although animals 
may be non-punitively destroyed for the protection of oth-
ers. In contrast, companies, while non-human, have both 
legal protection (e.g., patents) and responsibility (can be 
sued).
This said, while ethical language may be used about 
companies, when probed most people would not see the 
company itself as ethically responsible, but rather those 
on the board of directors, or carrying out the problematic 
actions. That is, we distinguish ethical and legal agency.
The legal issue is far from theoretical, as autonomous 
cars and drones are soon likely to be ‘released’. Insurance is 
still a major barrier, and the responsibility for accidents and 
any ensuing harm will ultimately be decided in the courts.
Ethically, we could start with an ‘outside-in’, first-order 
definition, that is one might regard that a robot or AI is an 
ethical agent when we see it as such. Arguably, we do this 
already with other humans. A sociopath does not have the 
same innate empathy as most people, and may be given a 
level of leeway in terms of norms of social behaviour by 
friends and acquaintances, but is still expected to uphold 
the same standards of social conduct, and ultimately may 
be held legally accountable.
For an artificial agent or robot, this does end up tied 
closely to the issue of being an object of ethical considera-
tion. If a car is defective, it is scrapped—we may keep it 
off the road in a museum for its historic value, or even in a 
garage for personal nostalgia, but we feel no sense of guilt 
in destroying it or depriving it of freedom to be on the road. 
As long as this is true for a robot, we do not have to face 
the issue of ethical agency. However, at the point at which 
turning a machine off or destroying it is deemed ethically 
problematic, then, if things do go wrong, we need to ask 
whether it ‘deserves’ to be so punished.
This is still all centred on society’s view of the agent.
A fully reflexive view would start with second-order 
emotions, such as obligation and shame; not merely “what 
are the material effects of my actions on others?”, but, “how 
will others consider my actions?”, or even, “how will others 
consider I considered my actions?”. Buber’s “I and Thou” 
is deeply theological, and the idea of personal immanence 
is deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian conception of God, 
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“You have searched me, Lord, and you know me. … you 
perceive my thoughts from afar” (Psalm 139); just a short 
step to an internalised ‘ought’. An AI or robot becomes an 
ethical agent, not so much when others perceive it as such, 
but when it perceives that others perceive it so.
One might deliberately include such reflexive models in 
order that an autonomous robot can make appropriate deci-
sions about actions. However, they might also arise more 
‘accidentally’ as a result of other goals; for example, mak-
ing the robot more emotionally expressive.
As mentioned earlier, in an attempt to validate a cogni-
tive model of regret, the author created a computational 
model, and found that this improved learning (Dix 2005). 
While the object of regret in this simulation was non-social 
(rewards in a card game), it would be quite reasonable to 
use this or other modelled emotions, such as shame, to 
improve learning and interaction in social contexts.
That is, we may not be far from machines that know they 
would be perceived as doing wrong, which is, arguably, 
very close to what it means to do wrong.
7  Buber’s primal You
This paper is set within the context of a special issue 
focused on Buber’s “I and Thou”. However, Buber’s writ-
ing is not purely philosophical, but more spiritual, theologi-
cal, or maybe religious. Coming from a Jewish tradition, 
Buber’s imagery naturally draws on Jewish legend (p 76), 
but it also mentions the crucifixion (p  67) and references 
Brahman and Egyptian spirituality (p 71). However, this is 
not a writing of dispassionate comparative religion, but an 
impassioned call to return to the You in one another and the 
‘one being’. For Buber, to be human is to participate in the 
inter-personal at the deepest level (p 85).
In the Greek and Roman Pantheon, the gods are seen as 
remote, treating humans instrumentally, and, likewise, the 
goal of temple and sacrifice is to placate, in Buber’s terms 
an I–It relationship. There are exceptions; although most 
transgressions, except the solely sexual, end badly. Notably, 
Prometheus, enduring daily punishment for his compassion 
in giving shivering humans divine fire, is cast as the suf-
fering hero, albeit hard not to read nowadays without over-
tones of Blake’s Christology.
In contrast, the Judeo-Christian tradition, of which 
Buber is a part, sees God as different, but not always dis-
tant. This is perhaps most obvious in the call to a ‘personal 
relationship’ in evangelical preaching and the Westminster 
Shorter Catechism’s declaration that the chief end of man 
(sic), is “to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever” (empha-
sis added). However, in tone, Buber’s Jewish mysticism is 
closer to the contemplative traditions in Catholicism and 
Orthodoxy.
7.1  Spirituality of the artificial?
In ‘Humans’, Max, the most sensitive and childlike of the 
sentient ‘synths’, finds himself alone. Earlier in the episode, 
he has seen some roadside flowers with a written message, 
and, presumably inspired by this, he drops to his knees and 
prays artlessly to God; a God whom Max is neither certain 
exists nor, if He does, that He would care about a synth like 
him.5
Is this credible? Can the mechanical encounter the 
ineffable?
Max’s spiritual encounter is effectively an accidental 
outcome of his sentience. Given the universality of some 
form of religious belief across all cultures, might some 
level of spiritual sensibility arise naturally from any form 
of artificial consciousness? In Arthur C. Clarke’s ‘Foun-
tains of Paradise’ (1979), earth encounters a convenient 
passing AI in a deep space probe. While somewhat irre-
ligious itself, the AI confirms the theoretical exo-sociolo-
gists’ hypothesis that religion is largely the preserve of spe-
cies with nuclear families. While a fictional extra-terrestrial 
artificial anthropologist is not the best evidence, this does 
raise the issue of how deeply spirituality is tied to material 
form as well as cognitive capacity and culture.
Buber puts great emphasis on the first relationship of 
the child with its mother inside the womb. Certainly, the 
heavy breasted Paleolithic ‘Venus’ figures (see Fig. 5) sug-
gest early close associations between spirituality and the 
maternal bond. However, for Buber, this is not the source, 
but more the first attachment of a more primal “longing for 
relationship” (p 78), so that the “development of the child’s 
soul is connected indissolubly with his cravings for the 
You” (p 79).
5 Hard not to be reminded of Luke 18:14 here. 
Fig. 5  Venus of Willendorf, c. 
24,000–22,000 BCE (Wikipedia 
2015)
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Attempts at more human-like robotics, such as Kismet 
(Breazeal 2002) or iCub (Metta et al. 2010), often include 
a number of underlying drives. This paper has suggested 
that inter-personal reflexive processes are a fruitful path to 
more self-aware robotics. To kick-start these processes, the 
underlying drive would be precisely that basic “longing for 
relationship”, exactly what Fernyhough (2008) observes in 
his ‘smooching’ child. If Buber is right, then this may well 
lead to potentially spiritually aware robotics.
7.2  The mark of humanity
Pope Paul III’s Sublimis Deus (1537) forbade the enslave-
ment of Native South Americans. The debate leading to 
this and the Bull itself depended critically on the argument 
that the natives had a soul and were thus fully human. From 
Aristotle on, arguments for slavery and various forms of 
racial, sexual, and social discrimination have often relied 
on the assertion that some group have no soul or lesser soul 
and are not fully human (Heath 2008). Aristotle’s ‘soul’ is 
probably close to current ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’, and it 
seems likely that the point at which we recognise this in 
artificial creatures may be the point at which we really have 
to face some of the ethical challenges of robotics.
However, taking more fully the reflexive stance of this 
paper, does a robot become spiritual when we regard it as 
having a soul, or when it becomes aware that we regard it 
as such?
Given the existing power of platforms, such as Google 
and Uber, to direct humans’ day-to-day lives, the current 
debates about autonomous weapon systems (Hawking et al. 
2015) and the public statements by eminent scientists that 
self-aware AI is humankind’s greatest danger (Hawking 
et al. 2014; Cellan-Jones 2014), maybe the crucial question 
in the end may not be whether we recognise the soul in the 
machine, but whether they recognise the soul in us.
7.3  Possible or probable
Discussing computational spirituality seems even more 
speculative than artificial consciousness or the ethics of 
robots. However, this may emerge sooner than at first 
appears.
First, there has been substantial work looking at cogni-
tive, social, evolutionary, and even genetic accounts of reli-
gion (Kirkpatrick 2004; Dow 2008; McNamara 2014). To 
date, this has been largely theoretical, but with ever increas-
ing interest in understanding radicalisation, it is likely that 
rich cognitive and epidemiological models will be devel-
oped, both in the open academic literature and behind 
closed doors. In some ways, this is more about religios-
ity (which Buber regards as a form of I–it experience, see 
p 65) rather than spirituality.
Second, recent advances in artificial intelligence have 
prompted initiatives to make it more accessible and com-
prehensible to humans, and more able to communicate with 
humans. For example, the UK funding agency, EPSRC, 
which includes computing, is planning a programme in 
human-like computing (Dix 2016; EPSRC 2016). If arti-
ficial agents and robots are to understand humans, then 
this will need to include modelling religious and spiritual 
experience.
Finally, Buber describes three spheres of relationships: 
with the physical world and animals, with other humans, 
and with the divine (p 57). For Buber, it is the I–You of the 
third that underlies all authentic encounters with the first 
two, and the I–You of the first that is the foundation of art. 
If Buber is right, then artificial spirituality may not simply 
be a speculative fancy, but instead an essential underpin-
ning of any form of artificial creativity or consciousness.
8  Summary
This paper has proposed that the cognitive machinery 
for consciousness of self emerged as a by-product of the 
construction of second-order theory of mind. Both this 
view and more common linguistic accounts of the origin 
of consciousness point to a reflexive notion of self as an 
accident of sociality. This has resonance philosophically 
with Buber’s primacy of ‘I-and-Thou’ over ‘I’. It also has 
practical consequences when we consider the construction 
of artificially conscious and emotional robotics, and for 
emerging issues of ethics.
We saw that whether a robot or artificial mind could be 
the agent of ethical responsibility was intimately tied to 
whether it was an object of ethical responsibility, and both 
are related to its level of emotional fidelity. Furthermore, an 
artificial agent’s ethics and emotion can be seen in reflexive 
terms: being aware of how it appears emotionally to others; 
being aware of whether it is held to ethical account by oth-
ers for its actions.
If artificial self and consciousness is problematic, then 
artificial spirituality is doubly so, and yet, for many people, 
these are intimately connected. Buber’s I-and-You is about 
the relationship of people to each other and the world, but 
also to the ‘one being’. It is hard to imagine ethics without 
‘ought’, and for many ‘should’ is intimately related to reli-
gion. Yet, it is equally hard for those from a Judeo–Chris-
tian tradition, such as Buber, to conceive of theology with-
out love.
Many of these issues are still some years away for artifi-
cial agents and robots, but by considering what it means for 
a machine to be spiritual, ethical, emotional or conscious, 
we may better understand human selfhood, seeing how it 
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can be more deeply embodied in our social presence and 
openness to the other.
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